

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SECTO 04014 01 OF 03 092249Z
ACTION EUR-12

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BERLIN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 04014

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, GE, GW
SUBJECT: QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY:
 MINISTERS' SESSION, MAY 9

1. THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS MET ON THE MORNING OF
MAY 9 AND HEARD UK POLITICAL DIRECTOR HIBBERT REPORT ON
THE MAY 7 SENIOR LEVEL CONSIDERATION OF BERLIN AND
GERMANY. THE MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS
OF HIBBERT'S REPORT.

2. HIBBERT'S REPORT TO MINISTERS WAS AS FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT:

A. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS ON
BERLIN MET ON SATURDAY MORNING AND AFTERNOON.

B. THEY FIRST COMPARED NOTES ON THE WAY IN WHICH
THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN WASHINGTON, PARIS AND
LONDON HAD RECEIVED THE ALLIED REPLY TO THE SOVIET
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SECTO 04014 01 OF 03 092249Z

DEMARCHE ON PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN. THE IMMEDIATE SOVIET
REACTIONS IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON HAD BEEN NOTABLE FOR
THEIR DISCLAIMER OF ANY INTENTION OF MAKING A MAJOR ISSUE
OUT OF THE MATTER. WE REACHED THE PROVISIONAL CONCLU-
SION THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING
ELEMENTS:

FIRST, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE ARMING

ITSELF WITH AN OPTION TO TAKE STEPS AGAINST ALLIED PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN WITHOUT PERHAPS HAVING THE INTENTION TO USE THE OPTION IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THEY COULD BE PREPARING THEMSELVES TO RETALIATE AGAINST FUTURE WESTERN MEASURES IN RELATION TO BERLIN, FOR EXAMPLE IN CONNECTION WITH BERLIN/EEC RELATIONS;

SECOND, THE SOVIET DEMARCHE SEEMS LIKELY TO BE INTENDED TO BE PART OF A LONGER-TERM PROCESS RATHER THAN TO THREATEN IMMEDIATE DESTABILISATION IN BERLIN;

THIRD, THE SOVIET DEMARCHE SEEMS TO BE TO SOME CONSIDERABLE EXTENT A RESPONSE TO GDR PRESSURE TO BE FREED FROM SERVITUDES ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY;

FOURTH, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ITSELF EMPHASISED ITS DESIRE TO KEEP THE EXCHANGE WITH THE ALLIES CONFIDENTIAL. THIS IMPLIES A DESIRE NOT TO PUSH MATTERS TO AN EXTREME AT THE PRESENT TIME.

C. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS APPROVED AND COMMENDED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION PREPARED BY THE BONN GROUP. THE ASSESSMENT WILL HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO MINISTERS BY THEIR OFFICIALS. THE ASSESSMENT CONCLUDES WITH FIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT ALLIED POLICIES AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN RELATION TO THE PROBLEM SET BY THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AGREED THAT, IF THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TAKE, OR PERMIT ACTION TO BE TAKEN, TO HALT, ARREST OR EXPEL ALLIED PATROLS IN EAST BERLIN, THE ALLIED RESPONSE WILL NEED TO COMBINE MEASURES IN BERLIN WITH MEASURES OUTSIDE BERLIN. THESE SHOULD BE BALANCED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE A CLEAR SIGNAL IN BERLIN OF THE INTENTION TO RESIST WHILE NOT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SECTO 04014 01 OF 03 092249Z

BECOMING LOCKED INTO AN EXCHANGE LIMITED TO BERLIN, BECAUSE THE RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER OF THE ALLIES IN BERLIN IS NOT STRONG. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER THE DESIRABILITY OF TAKING MEASURES TO EXPRESS THEIR DISPLEASURE WITH THE GDR AS WELL AS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE FRG/GDR RELATIONS HAVE A CHARACTER OF THEIR OWN SEPARATE FROM RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE GDR, A REASONABLE DEGREE OF HARMONY BETWEEN FRG POLICIES TOWARDS THE GDR AND US, FRENCH AND UK POLICIES TOWARDS THE GDR IS DESIRABLE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS RECOMMEND THAT THE BONN GROUP SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE STUDY OF THE MEASURES WHICH THE WESTERN POWERS MIGHT TAKE IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET ACTION AGAINST ALLIED PATROLS IF IT OCCURS. THE STUDY SHOULD CONCENTRATE PARTICULARLY ON IDENTIFYING WITH PRECISION THE MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN IN BERLIN AND THE IMPLICATION OF TAKING THEM, BUT SHOULD ALSO COVER MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN OUTSIDE BERLIN.

D. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS SUGGEST THAT THE FOUR

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SECRET

PAGE 01 SECTO 04014 02 OF 03 092254Z
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 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 04014

FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD INVITE THE FOUR HEADS OF
GOVERNMENTS TO ISSUE THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT ON BERLIN
WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY ALL FOUR GOVERNMENTS IN DRAFT.
THE STATEMENT WILL BE A TIMELY REINFORCEMENT OF THE FIRM
ATTITUDE TAKEN TOWARDS THE RECENT SOVIET DEMARCHE, BUT
IT SHOULD NOT BE ISSUED WITH REFERENCE TO CURRENT EVENTS
BUT RATHER IN A POSITIVE CONTEXT AS A STATEMENT ABOUT
THE IMPORTANCE OF BERLIN IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE AT THE
TIME OF THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COMING INTO FORCE
OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. THE ANNIVERSARY FALLS
ON 2 JUNE.

E. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS APPROVED A TEXT ON
BERLIN FOR INCLUSION IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUE. THIS, IF
APPROVED BY MINISTERS, WILL BE TABLED IN THE NATO DRAF-
TING COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON. THE NATO COLLEAGUES WILL
BE GIVEN COPIES OF THE STATEMENT BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
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SECRET

PAGE 02 SECTO 04014 02 OF 03 092254Z

AT THE SAME TIME. IT IS HOPED THAT THE NATO PARTNERS WILL READILY ACQUIESCE IN ENDORSING THE STATEMENT BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS. IF THEY HESITATE TO DO SO, THEY WILL BE INVITED TO ADOPT INSTEAD THE ALTERNATIVE TEXT WHICH REPEATS THE ESSENTIAL SENTENCE OF THE STATEMENT.

F. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS RECEIVED A REPORT FROM THE BONN GROUP ON THE WORK WHICH THEY ARE DOING ON BERLIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EEC. THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS APPROVED THE REPORT AND ASKED THE BONN GROUP TO COMPLETE THEIR STUDY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY NOTED THE IMPORTANCE IN THIS CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE EEC AND THE SOVIET UNION ON FISHING WITHIN THE 200-MILE EEZ OF THE NINE. THEY NOTED HERR GENSCHER'S RECENT STATEMENT ON THIS QUESTION TO THE COUNCIL OF THE EEC. THEY ALSO NOTED THE UNDESIRABILITY OF LETTING THE APPLICATION CLAUSE OF THE DRAFT FISHERIES AGREEMENT BECOME KNOWN AS A BERLIN CLAUSE. IT WOULD INDEIZEVEF BERLIN BUT IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT THIS IMPORTANT PRECEDENT

IF IT WERE NOT OVER-ADVERTISED.

G. FINALLY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AGREED TO RECOMMEND TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS THAT THEY SHOULD HOLD A FURTHER QUADRIpartite MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE CIEC CONFERENCE IN PARIS ON 30 AND 31 MAY WITH A VIEW TO DEALING WITH TOPICS OTHER THAN BERLIN ON THE ROUTINE, NON-SUMMIT SERIES OF QUADRIpartite MEETINGS. END TEXT.

3. FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN ASKED WHETHER THE M,RISTERS COULD ACCEPT THE QUADRIpartite DECLARATION IN ITS PRESENT FORM AND, IF SO, WOULD THEY AGREE TO RECOMMEND ITS ISSUANCE AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. ALL AGREED WITH THE PROPOSED TEXT AND TO RECOMMEND IT TO THEIR PRINCIPALS.

4. THE MINISTERS AGREED WITH THE SCENARIO OUTLINED BY
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SECRET

PAGE 03 SECTO 04014 02 OF 03 092254Z

HIBBERT FOR HANDLING THE BERLIN/GERMANY COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE IN THE SPC DRAFTING GROUP.

5. THE MINISTERS THEN TOOK UP THE BONN GROUP ASSESSMENT ON BERLIN, FOCUSING ON THE QUESTIONS AT THE END OF THE STUDY. OWEN LED OFF BY NOTING THAT THE SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE VARIOUS ALLIED STATEMENTS ON ALLIED PATROLS HAD BEEN LOW-KEY. HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, THAT WE COULD EXPECT FURTHER DIFFICULTIES WITH

THE SOVIETS ON PATROLS OR IN OTHER AREAS IN THE FUTURE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE BONN GROUP SHOULD UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF COUNTERMEASURES TO DEAL WITH SOVIET/GDR PRESSURES ON THE PATROLS. THIS STUDY OBVIOUSLY WAS OF HIGH PRIORITY. IT SHOULD BE AIMED AT PRESENTING OPTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO THE SOVIETS IN THE BERLIN CONTEXT, AT LEAST INITIALLY, BUT WE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE ALLIED ABILITY TO DO MUCH IN BERLIN ALONE WAS LIMITED. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US SIDE HAD ALREADY DONE SOME WORK ON CONTINGENCY MEASURES. HE HOPED THE BONN GROUP COULD BEGIN WORK SO THAT THE FOUR MINISTERS COULD HAVE AT LEAST A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE POSSIBLE MEASURES ON THE MARGINS OF THE CIEC MEETING IN PARIS (DE GUIRINGAUD SAID THAT A MEETING MIGHT BE POSSIBLE ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 1 BUT THAT A DEFINITE TIME WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT).

6. SECRETARY VANCE STATED THAT THE ALLIED RESPONSE TO THE SOVIETS ON PATROLS HAD BEEN CORRECT AND HE THOUGHT IT HAD HAD THE RIGHT EFFECT. HE WAS OF THE VIEW THAT WE COULD PROBABLY EXPECT MORE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE FUTURE IN BERLIN, PERHAPS IN THE FALL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US HAD DONE SOME WORK ON CONTINGENCY MEASURES AND SAID THAT WE WOULD BE CIRCULATING OUR

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PAGE 01 SECTO 04014 03 OF 03 092336Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 04014

SUGGESTIONS IN THE BONN GROUP NEXT WEEK.

7. GENSCHER NOTED THAT THE WEST FACED SEVERAL HANDICAPS IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS IN BERLIN. FIRST OF ALL, THERE WAS THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE CITY. THEN THERE WAS ITS POSITION IN THE SCHEME OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WHAT THE WEST HAD TO DO WITH THE SOVIETS WAS MAKE CLEAR THAT BERLIN AND DETENTE WERE INEXTRICABLY LINKED, THAT THE LEVEL OF DETENTE IN BERLIN WOULD DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF DETENTE GENERALLY. IN THAT WAY, BERLIN BECAME A USEFUL LEVER FOR THE WEST. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH GENSCHER AND THAT HE, IN HIS TALK WITH DOBRYNIN ON PATROLS, HAD STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS MUST PROCEED WITH GREAT CAUTION IN BERLIN IF THEY WISHED TO HAVE DETENTE CONTINUE.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 SECTO 04014 03 OF 03 092336Z

8. DE GUIRINGAUD SAID THAT HE TOO SAW BERLIN AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ENTIRE DETENTE PROCESS. BUT HE FELT THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS FAIRLY WEAK IN BERLIN. THERE WERE FEW MEASURES THAT ONE COULD TAKE IN BERLIN AGAINST THE SOVIETS THAT MIGHT NOT HARM THE ALLIED POSITION AS WELL.

9. OWEN SAID THAT, CONCERNING BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE GDR, THE UK WOULD THINK THAT SOME COOLING WOULD BE IN ORDER AS ONE OF THE POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES. HE REFERRED TO GORONWY-ROBERTS' RECENT VISIT TO THE GDR. HE COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO CANCEL OR POSTPONE THAT VISIT, AS OTHERS HAD SUGGESTED, EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT THE DATE WAS SO CLOSE. TO HAVE CANCELLED AT THE LAST MINUTE WOULD HAVE SEEMED TO BE SOMETHING OF AN OVER-REACTION. HOWEVER, WHEN GORONWY-ROBERTS WAS IN EAST BERLIN, HE HAD MADE CLEAR THE UK VIEWS ON BERLIN AND ITS ROLE IN THE DETENTE PROCESS. SO, FROM THAT VIEWPOINT, THE VISIT MAY HAVE BEEN USEFUL.

10. OWEN THEN TOOK UP THE BERLIN-EC ISSUE, NOTING THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE PRESENT EC-SOVIET FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS TO HAVE A NON-PROVOCATIVE CLAUSE ON THE AREA OF APPLICATION. GENSCHER SUPPORTED OWENS' REMARKS. HE SAID THAT IT HAD TO BE MADE CLEAR, IN BRUSSELS AND ELSEWHERE, THAT THE CLAUSE WAS NOT A BERLIN CLAUSE. THE LEGAL SITUATION WAS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE USUAL BERLIN CLAUSE IN AN FRG TREATY WITH ANOTHER COUNTRY.

HERE IT WAS A QUESTION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE EC TO
DECIDE ON THE AREA OF APPLICATION AND THAT DECISION HAD
ALREADY BEEN LONG TAKEN AS FAR AS WEST BERLIN WAS
CONCERNED. IN ANY CASE, HE THOUGHT THAT BERLIN WOULD
NOT BE A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE FISHERIES TALKS SINCE THE
SOVIETS SEEMED TO HAVE A GREAT INTEREST IN REACHING AN
AGREEMENT. OWEN CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY STATING
THAT HE HOPED THAT THE FURTHER BONN GROUP STUDY ON
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PAGE 03 SECTO 04014 03 OF 03 092336Z

BERLIN AND THE EC WOULD BE COMPLETED SOON.

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